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I.
Setting the scene:
Philip Allott has summarised the aim of his theory of Social Idealism in a pithy aphorism:
To change fundamentally the social organisation of the world by changing fundamentally the ideas that support the social organisation of the world. 2 The key features of Allott's Social Idealism are:
a belief in the capacity of the human mind to transcend itself in thought, to take power over the human future, to choose the human future, to make the human future conform to our ideals, to our best ideas of what we are and what we might be. 3 our unreliable hands. 10 On the other hand, Allott rails against a defeatism which sees the contemporary order of things as inevitable and natural as he is convinced of the transcendent possibilities of the human mind to make new the reality of social and international relations. This is, moreover, a moral necessity: "how can any morally sensitive person, knowing what happened in the twentieth century and seeing the prospects of the twenty-first century, fail to recognise a heavy burden of moral responsibility to do whatever can be done to improve human reality?". 11 Humankind may have unreliable hands, but not impotent minds.
Philip Allott's work is complex and challenging in both its substantive content and its mode of expression. It sets out a general (social) philosophy in which law plays an important role, rather than a philosophy of law as such. It is not a narrow pragmatic legal philosophy which aims to improve the functioning of law, nor a heuristic one in the sense that it seeks to provide better or optimal solutions to specific problems. 12 It simply does not fall within recognised categories of theoretical schools of legal philosophy. For instance, it is not an analytical positivist account of the structure of international law. 13 Nor, for that matter, is it "critical" in the contemporary sense of the broad church which is labelled "Critical Legal Studies", 14 although it is undoubtedly a work of critical social philosophy. The breadth of Allott's vision, and his idealism, distinguishes his work from its peers. It does not examine international law in isolation but rather integrates it within a framework of more fundamental, if not foundational, philosophical issues such as epistemology and the psychology of action. In doing so
Allott aims to provide a universal theory, "offering theoretical explanations which are not merely explanations valid for a given society at a given time". 15 Allott's work sets out his vision of eunomia, of good social order, which seeks to "re-imagine the human world by proposing a new ideal of international society, the society of all-humanity, the society of all societies". 16 Associated with this is his eutopian project which "includes the task of reconceiving the way in which we form our ideas, our values, and our purposes". 17 Allott notes that after the eunomian and eutopian projects, there remains the eusophian project which aims at reconceiving the universal, namely, religion. There are hints of this in Allott's work, but it is not developed in detail 18 although some commentators have noted its presence. 19 This introduction to Allott's philosophy of Social Idealism adopts the following structure. The next section discusses the style of his work, and introduces some of his principal recurring themes, and then a brief account is given of one of his key concepts-the idea of the ideal. Following this, Allott's account of the role of the human mind to structure social reality, and its power to restructure that reality, is summarised.
An account is then given of his criticism of the existing international order which he blames on the influence of Vattel and castigates as privileging the interests of States or ruling élites over those of humanity as a whole. His antidote to this state of affairs, which lies in the implementation of Social Idealism and indeed the moral imperative to do so, is then examined, along with the role and importance of law in this process. The final section considers some criticisms of Allott's theory. 18. While religion is touched on in Eunomia (94-96, ¶6.18-6.23) and Health of nations (see 267-268, ¶9.10-9.13 and 354-357, ¶12.33-12.38), the most sustained exposition of this aspect of Allott's thought appears to be in an as yet unpublished paper he presented to the Cambridge University Catholic Graduate Society on 2 November 2009, The revolutionary potentiality of Catholic Christianity. In this he drew a "radical distinction" between Catholic Christianity and the Roman Catholic Church, "Catholic Christianity is a wonderful thing, a source of joy and hope. The Roman Church is a problem" ( ¶39). In this paper Allott called for a coalition of "all those people who are still able to recognise intellectually the trancendental dimension within human existence, whether or not they profess any particular religion" ( ¶116) in order to reach a new "understanding of the structural dimensions of human existence" ( ¶140). This is not a narrowly Christian enterprise, but one which acknowledges that other transcendental religions "are on the right side in proclaiming a layer of reality and value transcending the harsh reality of the everyday world, and, particularly, the world of the 21st century" ( ¶124).
19. See, for example, the comments by Sands, Allott, Knop, Franck and Tasioulas in Thinking another world, above n.1, at 267-268, 270 and 286-287.
II. Reading, and re-reading, Philip Allott
On reading Philip Allott, one is immediately struck by his unusual style of writing. It is dense, repetitive, and can be hypnotic. There are few simple declarative or propositional sentences. It can be rather daunting to understand, or even to read, until one gets used to it-"the prose flows and unsettles and flusters and finally threatens to overwhelm: blink, and you might miss it". 20 Allott's style has attracted comment, 21 but it is an intentional feature of his work:
As to the style question, the esoteric style, I agree that it is literature one is trying to write. I can't see what the point of academic writing is. But literature is performative in character. The act of doing it is its content...The influential books in the world have not been concerned with academic debates. They have been performative events invoking the imagination of the reader to join in. 22 This idea of philosophy as literature might explain, in whole or in part, Allott's novels, but a paradox is that Invisible power 1 and Invisible power 2 both contain extensive references and explanatory notes while Eunomia, nakedly, does not.
Eunomia is an unusual book if we consider that it is aimed at an academic audience. It breaks all the rules of academic protocol. It contains neither footnotes, nor bibliography, nor the exegesis of other theories. As Allott states, "the book does not seek to be taken up into the academic mill of reinterpretations of previous interpretations of thought about social and legal philosophy. The dimensions of history-history as individual and collective memory, history as the influence of the past in the present, history as the projection of the past through the present into the future-are a constant presence in Allott's writing. History is multifaceted in its significance and in the consequences it has had, has now, and might have for human society. It is not an overstatement to state that, for Allott, individual and societal attitudes to, and awareness of, history and historical forces are crucial factors in the process which will determine whether humankind flourishes or withers.
Like history, language plays a central role in Allott's work. Language constructs the world-"The human world is a world of words". Language is a necessary component of social reality because it allows for communication:
Connecting the personal mind, where we speak to ourselves in isolation, to the interpersonal and social minds, and by integrating the personal and social minds Allott's work consciously plays on the limitations of language, and in particular its imprecision. 37 Language is not univocal: each word carries a range of meaning.
Language is accordingly inherently ambiguous. The Polish-Belgian rhetorical theorist
Chaïm Perelman illustrated the non-univocity of language using the notion of apparent tautology such as "boys will be boys" or "business is business". To give these intelligible meaning, different interpretations must be given the repeated terms, whereas in formal logical systems propositions such as these would be meaningless because of the systemic requirement of the principle of identity which requires that terms be univocal: let x = x conveys no information, apart from the postulate that x is, indeed, x. 38 Allott exploits the equivocal nature of natural language, the multiple meanings of words, through the use of repetition which relies on subtle shifts in the meaning of the terms employed. This, in turn, extends the definition of these terms and is an aspect of the "relentless creation of new, and problematisation of old, vocabulary" to which
MacDonald refers. 39 The result is a style of writing which can be rather hypnotic and, as international society of all-humanity, the society of all societies, is a unique but ever-changing product of its threefold self-constituting. In its ideal constitution, a society presents its becoming to itself as actuality and potentiality, forming a reality-for-itself which includes its history; its self-explanatory theories and its ideals. In its real constitution, the willing and acting of individual human beings is socialised as they exercise social power in the course of their personal selfconstituting. In its legal constitution, social power is given the form of legal power, so that the willing and acting of individual human beings may serve the common interest of society in its self-constituting. 41 The key term in this paragraph is obviously "constitution", but consider how its meaning mutates. The first use seems counter-intuitive: to say that a society does not have a constitution seems odd, as one could argue that most societies are governed by reference to some foundational legal document(s), in other words, by a constitution.
But, as the second sentence makes clear, this is not the meaning the term is initially intended to bear, nor is it its primary meaning. A more corporeal understanding is intended: a constitution in the sense of the structure and functioning of the body politic, but there is no uniform template-each society has to fashion its own. This act of selfcreation (of self-constitution) has three aspects, and is never finished because the ideal constitution is essentially aspirational as it guides the future development of the society.
The real constitution lies in the daily life of the individuals who compose the given society, the aggregation and integration of the activities they undertake in the pursuit of their own ends. Only the third aspect, the legal constitution, approximates to the lawyer's common understanding of "constitution".
III. Threes and twos-and towards the ideal:
It is worth pointing out a further rhetorical feature of this passage which is common in Allott's work. He often splits a concept or a general term into three parts-a triad. This has a resemblance to the rhetorical "rule of three" which is often employed in political discourse as well as in literature: 42 in classical rhetoric, this is termed a tricolon. This may be a chance phenomenon in Allott's writing style rather than a conscious choice, as not all concepts are split into triads. For example, he argues that there are four levels of reality of the human world: the so-called real reality which comprises "the world of power, war, murder, diplomacy, marriage, procreation, society, law"; philosophical reality which is the world made by the mind and the mental construction of concepts-"good is good, and evil is evil because thinking makes them so"; psychological reality which lies in inter-personal relationships and "normal and abnormal states of mind";
and imaginary reality "where the world's a stage and we make reality out of dreams and the imaginative power of language, where everything is possible". 43 In contrast, Allott is much more explicit in his reliance on the use of contrasting or opposing pairs in the construction of his argument 44 . He sees this duality as a natural, and possibly biological, propensity of the human mind which in philosophy is expressed in dialectical thought:
What may be an aspect of the physiology of the human brain, which has determined the functioning of the human mind, and which has been reproduced in the structure of human language through the long process of socialising, has
given to human reality a peculiarly dualistic structure-life and death, being and nothing, appearance and reality, essence and existence, mind and matter, good and evil, pleasure and pain, true and false, the past and the future, the actual and the potential. 45 Of these contrasting pairs, the most important for the realisation of eunomia is that of "the actual and the potential" which has "allowed us to make human reality into a moral order in which the actual can pass judgement upon itself by reference to its better potentiality, which is the ideal". 46 The never-ending quest for the ideal, the pursuit of the aspirational, is the central message of Allott's philosophy of Social Idealism. This encompasses a set of interlocking propositions, namely: a belief in the reality of the human mind; that the human mind is capable of reconstructing reality in the form of ideas; that the human mind is capable to share consciousness not only in interpersonal relations but also in society, which he sees as an organised sharing of consciousness;
and that the human mind can determine individual and social human behaviour in terms of ideals. 47 The potential for human self-creation, and thus the self-constituting of human societies, accordingly, lies in the ideal. This occurs when the mind evaluates the present by reference to a possible imagined future state of affairs which it thinks is better. Quite simply, the human mind has the power to form the future by imagining what that future should be, and then use reason to implement this idea. Ideas, however, are not selfexecuting as consciousness only "enables us to present possibilities to ourselves before we take action". 48 Action depends on choice, on an act of will, whose exercise depends on values to serve "as a ground for choosing between possibilities". 49 Among "the ideas which help constitute a society are ideas of a particular kind", namely ideals:
Our ideals allow us to say what is wrong with our world and to imagine ways in which it could be better, and they inspire us to want to make a better world...A society which did not contain the idea of the ideal would be, at best, a static society or, more probably, a self-destroying society. It is for this reason that we look anxiously and hopefully for any signs of the idealizing of international society, a society whose long pre-history...has been filled with the follies and the evils perpetrated by holders of public power. 50 Progress towards this better future is dependent upon a moral choice: the decision to take action to realise this concept of the ideal. 51 The parameters of the ideal are determined by human imagination as it contemplates the present, but the reimagination of the actual state of affairs is a constant process which lies in the "dialectical negation of the actual which nevertheless affirms a potentiality of the actual.
The ideal is the perfectability of the actual". 52
This process could be mundane: it could simply be the realisation that a specific problem exists which needs to be addressed, and the consequent formulation of a proposed solution. While this piecemeal approach surely is implicated in the realisation of the ideal, in Allott's work, the principal emphasis is much more ambitious than a mere incremental tinkering with social conditions, presented in the guise of discrete particular issues. He aims to transcend and transform existing social structures-"To change fundamentally the social organisation of the world by changing fundamentally the ideas that support the social organisation of the world". 53
IV.
Thinking, and rethinking, the world:
Accordingly, at the heart of Allott's project lies an ultimate conviction in the power of ideas both to structure and to change-to restructure-the world:
We make the human world, including human institutions, through the power of the human mind. What we have made by thinking we can make new by new thinking. 54 Societies create themselves on the basis of ideas-"Each human society is an infinitely complex and dynamic structure of ideas. The health of a society, its degree of wellbeing, is determined by the ideas which take actual effect in the process of its day-today self-constituting as a society. To reform or redeem a society is to change those determining ideas. Our quality of life is a function of the quality of our ideas". 55 Human consciousness accordingly provides the template for human reality and thus human action.
Allott employs a wide notion of "society" which encompasses human groups which range from the family through the State to the "international society of the whole human race"-"the society of all societies". The feature common to all is that they are ultimately constituted through the operation of the human mind. The public mind of a society (or social consciousness) operates in ways akin to that of individuals, but also in ways peculiar to itself. 56 A significant difference, for example, is that a society's public mind, while resulting from the product of "particular human minds at particular moments in time", persists through time and provides the environment in which not only that society's self-consciousness is formed and mutates but also provides the environment in which the minds of society-members are formed: 57
Societies live within the theories they make. A society generates a theory-filled reality which shapes its willed action which, in turn, shapes its actual everyday living. 58
National self-consciousness, and specifically national identity, is constituted through received historical narratives and ideas of tradition and values which are transmitted down through generations-"We are as we are because we have been as we were". It is also constructed in opposition to others-"We are who we are because, fortunately, we are not as other peoples are". This might, in turn, impact on the personal identity of individuals-"I am as I am because we are who we are". 59
National identity is, however, only one aspect of the broad social public mind or societal self-consciousness:
The 'end of ideology' was a thing people hoped for in the twentieth century. By 'ideology' they meant the social enforcement of big ideas. But one thing we have learned is that you cannot escape ideology. All societies enforce big ideas. 60
Society's ideas are, moreover, idea-forces as they are ideas which have the power to control human lives: 61
The monopolising of a society's mental power is as much as threat to its freedom as the monopolising of its political or economic power. A failure in the creative energy of a society's mental production, a decline in the value of its gross mental product, is likely to be a symptom, sometimes even a cause, of that society's general decay. 62 To counter this danger the solution lies within the mind: "the only power over power is the power of ideas". 63
Allott's social idealist theory aims at realising for humanity "the natural human purpose of survival and prospering". 64 This is rooted in "the wonderful capacity of human consciousness to make the future other than it has been...to choose its future from all the possibilities which imagination can conceive and which reason can order". 65 This requires humanity "to take possession of the waste-land of international society in international society has the ultimate capacity to enable all societies to promote the ever-increasing well-being of themselves and their members, the ultimate responsibility to prevent societies from doing harm to themselves and to other societies. It is in international society that humanity's capacity to harm itself can achieve its most spectacular effects. And it is in international society that the ever-increasing well-being of the whole human race can, must, and will be promoted. 68 At the root of Allott's explanation is the notion of consciousness, the active power of the human mind to determine the course of human affairs -"In forming our ideas we form our reality. In forming our reality we form our consciousness. In forming our To change human consciousness is to change human reality. To change human reality is to change the course of human history. It follows that, if it is our purpose to make a new human reality, we must find a way to stimulate the selfconsciousness, the sense of social responsibility, the moral awareness, and the intellectual creativity of the ruling class...and, especially, of those who hold responsible positions in the mental service-industries-religion, politics, administration, commerce, the law, mathematics and the natural sciences, literature and the fine arts, the media of information and entertainment. It is they whose responsibility is not merely to imagine a new human reality but also to transform the human world as it is into the human world as it will be. 74
Allott's avowed aim is manifestly revolutionary. Vattel's Droit des gens "was on the desk of every diplomat for a century or more.
It was a book which formed the minds of those who formed international reality, the 78. Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1767) was a Swiss-born diplomat whose major work, Droit des gens: ou, principes de la loi naturelle appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains (The law of nations, or the principles of natural law applied to the conduct and to the affairs of nations and of sovereigns) was published in 1758.
79. Allott's distinction between practical and pure theories is that a practical theory is society's way of explaining to itself or justifying the actions it takes, the choices it makes, and its social arrangements. A pure theory lies behind the practical theory as it is the way it explains its practical theory, for example, a theocracy would explain itself in terms of the religion to which it adheres. Allott classifies Eunomia as an essay in pure theory, international reality which is still our reality today". 82 extend this changed nature of social relationships to the international sphere-"an oldregime ruling-class managed to retain its dominance over international social consciousness, long after it had lost dominance over social consciousness within some national societies". 87 Thus international unsociety remained "a constitution-free zone", "a form of co-existence which was clearly not a society, with only the most crude of organising systems (diplomacy, war)":
And international unsociety was evidently a morality-free zone, in which moral discourse had only a marginal rhetorical or tactical function, and the only recognised ethical imperative was a self-judging machiavellian princely virtue.
For the controllers of the national public realms and their apologists, and international public realm without law or justice seemed to be a state of nature of the most exciting kind, in which the survival of the fittest is decided by an intoxicating mixture of urbane diplomacy and mass murder". 88 This was the inevitable outcome of the reception of Vattellian thought which came to structure the practice of international affairs as a result of the Congress of Vienna (1815)-"the last great party of the old order dancing on its own grave": 89
It is a reality which was welcome to the ruling classes of western Europe, the classes who still had most control over social reality-forming, including the selfconceiving of society in theory and including reality forming far beyond the The holders of public-realm power, kings and public officials, could identify their self-interest with the public interest of the One they so nobly served, and could, by force or mind-manipulation, induce the people to suppose that it was their patriotic and moral duty to kill and be killed by their neighbours on behalf of their own co-called commonwealths. 92 Perhaps cynically, but definitely wryly, Allott recounts "a lesson which is as old as human society. The only constant in human social history is the ruthless self-protecting of social privilege. The only human right which is universally enforced is the right of the rich to get richer". 93 The problem, however, lies not so much the State as such, but with governing élites. 94 The State has an important role to play in facilitating the inter-play and reconciliation of individuals, social organisation and the common interest. The Vattelian tradition, however, conceives the State as an organ of public power which is both hierarchically superior to and in competition with (if not opposition to) other loci of public power and private interest. The State is thus divorced from the society to which it gives formal expression, and the effects of this are intensified in international relations. 95 As Tasioulas has noted, while it may be argued that international law should be responsive to the interests of humans, the best way of serving these interests might be through norms which are predominantly addressed to States. 96 Nevertheless, the conduct of international affairs through State-centred mechanisms had the result that sovereignty, which projects "an authority-based view of society", became the structural premise of international affairs. This:
tend[s] to make all society seem to be essentially a system of authority, and . . . to make societies incorporating systems of authority seem to be the most significant forms of society, at the expense of all other forms of society, including non-patriarchal families, at one extreme, and international society, at the other. 97 The consequence is that this State-centred international system alienates people from international law which "seems to be the business of a foreign realm, another world, in which they play no personal part". 98 It is something, at best, imposed upon them and not something in which they participate, nor forge through the force of their consciousness. Thus the dominant perception has arisen that domestic and international affairs are "intrinsically and radically separate" 99 as citizens can only participate in international affairs through the mediation of their governments.
International law has not been integrated into the social process of humanity and is
have not joined the end-of-sovereignty movement. Everyone knows that the state is going to go on in some sense". "doomed to be what it has been-marginal, residual, and intermittent". 100 As things stand, "international law is left speaking to governments the words that governments want to hear" 101 and remains marginal in the international system:
International law has been neither very threatening nor very useful to the politicians and the diplomats". 102 This is not the way things should be, as law is a core institution of society, "an integral part of the whole activity of consciousness, individual and social". 103 In current circumstances, this alienated international law cannot play its proper part in the realization of eunomia-"the good order of a self-ordering society".
International unsociety has chosen "to regard itself as the state externalized, undemocratized, and unsocialized". 104 The purposes pursued in the world of States are those of States: "purposes related to the survival and prospering of each of those statesocieties rather than the survival and prospering of an international society of the whole human race". 105 Morality has thus become discontinuous between the domestic and international spheres, 106 and governments are able to act internationally free from the moral restraints that constraint them in domestic affairs, "murdering human beings by the million in wars, tolerating oppression and starvation and disease and poverty, human cruelty and suffering, human misery and human indignity": 107 we have witnessed countless examples of realities, both religious and political, whose inner perspective was absolute moral certainty and whose outer expression was morally outrageous behaviour. 108 Despite the exclusion of wider humanity from the consciousness and thus the conduct of international relations, despite the dissociation of the national and the international, despite the self-serving immorality of ruling élites, humanity is somehow strangely resilient:
It is remarkable that the human species has managed to survive for almost 250 years in the grip of the bizarre Vattelian legal world-view. In the twentieth century, the crazy idea that the human race might not survive was treated as a suitable topic for rational discussion and rational decision-making. People who are otherwise sane and sensible could talk about Mutually Assured Destruction and the End of Civilisation. People who are otherwise sane and sensible could make and manage total war, wars with no necessary geographical limit, no effective limit to the methods of death and destruction, no limit to the suffering to be endured by powerless and blameless human beings. In the twentieth century, people who are otherwise decent and caring could regard it as regrettable, but natural that countless millions of human beings should live in conditions of life which are a permanent insult to their humanity, or in chaotic societies dignified by the name of 'state', or in subjection to criminal conspiracies dignified by the name of 'government'. 109 Societies, like individuals, know good but do evil, but how can individuals take power over the power of society to do evil? If we believe that the power of the human mind cannot transcend the existing social systems it created, this accords these systems "a moral omnipotence" which results in "a form of human self-dehumanising". 120 Social systems, and the conditions they have created, must be transcended by the power of the human mind. The notion of the ideal allows us to transform societies, and we have a moral duty to make a better human future. 121 Because individual consciousness creates national consciousness, we have a moral responsibility for the content of that national consciousness, 122 and the role of the ideal is to evaluate the current conditions to determine a better future. The bridge between the past and the future lies in the present, which thus is pivotal in influencing the move from the actual to the potential.
VI. From Lake Geneva to the
Living in the present entails responsibility-"the permanent and inescapable burden of choosing the future, of choosing what to do next". 123 For individuals and societies, the passage of time is a process of becoming but it is also a process of choosing to become.
Humans are moral beings because we cannot avoid the charge of choosing, of deciding how to act. We have a moral responsibility regarding the future, and how it is to be shaped. 124 We cannot, however, be sure that a chosen projected future will come in to being:
We can make the future but we cannot determine it. What will be will be what we do, but not only what we do. The future will also be made by the willing and acting of other human beings and other human societies. 125 When public interest permits no other course of action, governments and officials will continue to do evil-"To do evil is to do good, if that is their professional duty, as they understand their duty"-and their self-justification of the course of conduct adopted will become increasingly more sophisticated as challenges become more sophisticated. an evil social order can only be overcome by a higher moral order-"The actual is made better only by the power of negation which is present in our knowledge of the good". 127
In this process of re-envisioning society, law-but not legalism-plays a key role.
Legalism is a perversion of the law, and Allott sees it as an unfortunate and persistent feature of the current international unsociety of States: Law is a presence of the social past. Law is an organising of the social present.
Law is a conditioning of the social future. 131 Law is not a system of legal rules but one of legal relationships which creates a parallel legal reality "in which every possible aspect of social reality has a second significance, in which language has a legal meaning, persons have a legal status, natural and human events have a legal character". 132 This rather dense account of the role and importance of law needs to be unpacked.
In Allott's theory, law is the intermediary between power and ideas: it is the mechanism by which ideas are given substance in the lives of societies-"In the making of the human world, nothing has been more important than what we call law". 133 In particular, law is the principal mechanism through which Allott's notion of the ideal may be put into practical effect because law is a social institution which subsists through time. This allows societies to carry structures and systems from the past through the present to the future:
Law defeats the passage of time by retaining choices made in a society's past, in a form-the law-which can take effect in a society's future. The law which is retained from society's past takes effect in society's present, as the law is interpreted and applied in the light of actual circumstances, and so helps to make society's future. The law carries the past through the present into the future.
The law offers to society stability in the midst of ceaseless change, and change- from-stability as new human circumstances demand new human choices...Law is a wonderful, and insufficiently appreciated, human invention. 134 Law provides a platform in which critical evaluations of existing arrangements may be embodied in authoritative form in order to pursue and effectuate a situation which is perceived to be better. It maybe recalled that Allott refers to the ideal as "the perfectability of the actual" which can be expressed in terms of truth and value. As such, the ideal can become the governing principle of individual and social action:
at every level of social organisation from the village to the international society of all-humanity. The ideal can determine the way in which we understand our potentiality for self-perfecting. It can then condition our choice among our system cannot be better than the social consciousness that it enacts", 144 and a perverted social consciousness can result in law that promotes social evil rather than the common interest. This can be done in one or more of four ways: by permitting conduct which should be prohibited; by using categories which are in themselves evil (for instance, just war theory); by turning complex human judgements into legalistic disputations; or by making an evil status quo resistant to a good status ad quem. 145 As evidence of this, the pernicious influence of the social consciousness arising from the Vattellian international system, and the discontinuity this has engendered between national and international notions of morality, culminated during the twentieth century in:
war, genocide, oppression, exploitation and the physical and mental degradation of human beings on an unprecedented scale, all in the name of ideas. All this in a century in which fantasy-forms, new mythologies, came to be the dominant form in which the ruling classes, political and economic, communicate with the people.
A godless world is, once again, full of gods, to echo Thales, the pre-Socratic philosopher. Max Weber said that the old gods, with their magic taken away, rise up from their graves, in the form of impersonal forces. 146 Law is a core institution of society, "an integral part of the whole activity of consciousness, individual and social", 147 but in current circumstances, as international law is alienated from all-humanity's consciousness, it cannot play its proper part in the realization of eunomia-"the good order of a self-ordering society"-as "The governments of states, acting in relation to each other, are at an infantile stage of moral Somehow, in the new century and the new millennium, humanity has to find the courage to believe in its own self-transforming potentiality, its unlimited capacity for self-evolving and self-perfecting. Humanity is its own re-creator.
We are what we think...It is a call to a human revolution, a revolution not in the streets but in the human mind. 149
VII. Original sin and the banality of evil:
If Allott's inclusive international society were to be realised, international law would become a matter directly within individual consciousness. Accordingly, individuals (ultimately) rather than the State would determine and thus be responsible for the substantive content of international law. With that responsibility, Allott's hope is that morality would no longer be discontinuous between domestic and international society.
But is this too much to hope for? Does Allott's theory present us with a vision or merely a vain illusion? Can it provide a blueprint for a better future capable of practical implementation, or is it condemned to be a speculative chart of an unrealisable path to a non-existent Shangri-la? It could be argued that it all depends. Allott has, indeed, been accused of being a hopeless idealist, consciously adrift in a dream of utopia. But what does his theory offer? For Allott, law as a social technique, is "a more or less empty framework capable of taking more or less any substantive content". 150 He is not programmatic about how that technique is to be used, although hopes that it should be used for the good. Nor, for that matter, does he specify the end to be sought, apart from his constant plea for the amelioration of the human condition. There is no determinate end-point identified in Allott's theory because the process of becoming is never-ending because it is the aspirational in pursuit of the ideal:
In the Western philosophical tradition, originating in the philosophy of ancient Greece, it was very soon accepted that there could be no one answer, let alone one final answer. On the contrary, the clash of opposing solutions to the problem itself became the means of powerfully enriching the substance of human self- And no doubt the dialectic projects into the human future.
Koskenniemi argues that Allott's work embodies the politics of conservative revolution, and continues a tradition which has sought "new ways to articulate the basis for a universal law", 152 which is perhaps appropriate for a High Tory Bolshevik, but he also notes the absence of substantive political theory:
After the "Nations" have been restored to their "Health" through the therapeutic effects of everyone finally seeing the truth, all the rest (what rest?) will either happen automatically or will be left for the projects that enlightened human beings will now be able to agree upon in their (now enlightened) political process. 153 David Kennedy has made a similar observation: "We have always thought politics was everywhere and what we needed was law; Philip was, I think, the first to say clearly that we have got law everywhere, and how did we come to be so governed with so little politics". 154 I think that Allott would not disagree with these assessments as, after all, he counsels that the international system needs to develop a political process that would allow it to determine its own values and purposes; 155 politics determines what will become embodied in law; and law is "the most efficient instrument for the actualising of the ideal". 156 Allott's work sets out a vision of difference, of how the world could be if "the bizarre Vattelian legal world-view" 157 were discarded, but it does not detail the precepts that should be implemented to achieve that vision. The probability is that this vision can never be realised, but is rather an ideal, an aspiration, to which humanity should strive:
[There is] no action-programme, no enforceable orthodoxy...only a foundational belief-in the power of the mind to make and re-make reality. And...a foundational value-the value of value. Our revolutionary programme is the revaluation of values through the revaluing of the idea of value. The only power over power is the power of ideas. The only power over bad ideas is better ideas.
Our revolution is a revolution in the mind, not in the streets. 158 Accordingly, Allott's vision of eunomia is undoubtedly idealist, which some have criticised. He correctly rejects this criticism as unfounded: ideas are the basis for the understanding, structuring and restructuring of the world. This is apparent in any society as politics, the claims made about the way in which that society should develop, is manifestly the clash of ideas. 159 Less easy to shrug off is the criticism of utopianism. 160 Allott assumes that a fully socialised international society will be benevolent and eschew conflict, which he thinks arises from the competing interests of States. Allott roundly denies that the criticism of utopianism has any force:
In response to this criticism, it is surely only necessary to say that our experience of the revolutionary transformation of national societies has been that the past 159. See Eunomia, xxxi.
160. Strictly, Allott would categorise his vision as eutopian, rather than utopian as the "word eutopia (good place) is used...in preference to the word utopia (no place), another invented word using Greek roots, to emphasise that the nature of the New Enlightenment challenge is to find and to enact the new ideals of a new human mind-world, rather than, as in Thomas More's Utopia (1516), to criticise the actual by reference to an imaginary alternative which, in More's own pessimistic words...he wished rather than expected to see realised"-Health of nations, 132 at 156, ¶5.70, n30.
conditions the future but that it does not finally and inescapably determine it.
We have shown that we can think ourselves out of the social jungle. 161 This riposte fails to convince; the possibility of escape from any jungle is mere speculation. It would perhaps have been better, more grounded in his own argument, he is of the opinion that globalisation seems to contain the critical mass of economic, political and social factors that will demand fundamental global change. 165 Having said that, Allott's presupposition that humanity would develop a more just, loving and peaceful consciousness and choose to implement this in its social reality is difficult to accept without some hesitation. His argument is predicated on the belief This is a natural process in the self-constituting of societies: they have a capacity for self-improvement, but they have terrible evil capacities as well, and I believe that consciousness flows between the two, the private mind and the public mind, form of public rather than private evil, which Allott terms "social evil", and which at times may not be morally attributable to individuals as it is "social-systematic evil, evil generated systematically by social systems", such as the asocial conduct of international affairs . 167 Consequently, it seems that Allott does not consider evil to be a necessary part of the human condition, and that it may be banished through the transformation of human consciousness in the strive for eunomia-"things could become better ,very much better-as they have in many national societies-if we are clever enough and if we allow ourselves to be led by the potentiality of self-perfecting inherent in individual and social behaviour". 168 This belief, nevertheless, appears to be more an act of faith than a demonstrable proposition. As St Augustine argued in The City of God, man's free will may be exercised perversely, to attain evil or sinful ends:
Accordingly God, as it is written, made man upright, and consequently with a good will. For if he had not had a good will, he could not have been upright. The good will, then, is the work of God; for God created him with it. But the first evil will, which preceded all man's evil acts, was rather a kind of falling away from the work of God to its own works than any positive work. And therefore the acts resulting were evil, not having God, but the will itself for their end; so that the will or the man himself, so far as his will is bad, was as it were the evil tree bringing forth evil fruit. 169 But need one consciously do evil to be evil, or be evil to do evil consciously? What are the implications of everyday and commonplace individual evil for Allott's world-view?
In Allott's theory, consciousness is formed by élites and, when this is fed into the social system, it is adopted or followed by the less-élite: in the latter's conception of social action, in their expression of the social good, they only follow orders. In her report of the Eichmann trial, 170 Hannah Arendt coined the phrase the "banality of evil" to express this phenomenon:
when I speak of the banality of evil, I do so only on the strictly factual level, pointing to a phenomenon which stared one in the face at the trial. Eichmann was not Iago and not Macbeth, and nothing would have been further from his mind than to determine with Richard III "to be a villain". Except for an extraordinary diligence in looking out for his personal advancement, he had no motives at all. And this diligence was in no way criminal; he certainly would never have murdered his superior in order to inherit his post. He merely, to put the matter colloquially, never realized what he was doing. 171 mind that Allott sees social evil as comprehending more than conduct which is criminal, whether in the domestic or international spheres. Indeed, Allott is hostile to the very idea of international criminal law-"Feeble old men and their seedy subordinates shuffle into the court-room, shrunken figures bearing no physical relationship to the physical scale of the suffering for which they are responsible...The causes and the effects of extreme social evil remain, its human price, but our moral outrage is clouded by the charade of judicial retribution". 173 But if the consciousness of the less-élite is formed by the social forces put into play by the élite, does Allott demand too much of the latter in renewing consciousness and thus society? He appears to assume, or demand, that they will demonstrate a degree of scepticism and critically reflect upon ideas and values which they hold dear.
Some might not wish, or be afraid, to do this: for example, those committed to a strict religious perspective might not consider questioning of their beliefs or the resulting social consequences because it is sinful or forbidden to do so. How can people transcend ideas, whether religious, political, or of whatever stamp, which are constitutive of their identity, fundamental to their understanding of who they are? The problem is the idealism demanded of the idealist: Allott seems to demand a dynamic fluidity of being which is perpetual in its process of becoming.
Allott also perhaps fails to give due weight to the possibility that social evil may emerge from idealistic or even (e)utopian intentions as the unintended consequence of intended action. The 1917 Russian revolution, and subsequent Stalinist terror, is perhaps an example of a politically structured reality "whose inner perspective was absolute moral certainty and whose outer expression was morally outrageous and an important one at that, but it was also a part of everyone's everyday experience in the 1930s. A Soviet citizen might believe or disbelieve in a radiant future, but could not be ignorant that one was promised. 175 Allott sees totalitarianism, whether of left and right, as deploying "the power of the mind-filling institutional authority of the state-system". 176 Within such a system, the question must arise of how dissent, an alternative consciousness, can take root and become the social consciousness necessary to effect change? As he notes:
By the end of the twentieth century, we...found ourselves living in societies in which reality is, for the individual society-member, a heteronomy, societies so complex that we can no longer identify the processes by which social reality is formed, societies in which the public mind contains, in a turmoil of mutual conditioning, the despotism of rationalistic bureaucracy, the anarchic order of extra-parliamentary politics, the imperious order of the market-place, and the fantasy-forms of popular culture. 177 Yet, as history has shown, even totalitarian societies fade and fall away. Allott is perhaps not candid enough on how this process can and does occur as a matter of practical rather than pure theory, and this also appears to be true for his exhortations regarding the reconnection of morality with action in the international system.
Allott does not see hope for change in the organisation and conduct of existing international unsociety lying in the emergence of "international civil society", and argues that this notion must be treated with caution. The contemporary understanding of civil society Allott traces to Hegel, which contrasts civil society with the public power of the State. This contradicts orthodox views of liberal democracy which require people to govern themselves through representative institutions. Accordingly:
To introduce into international society the idea that governments and intergovernmental organization simply co-exist with a random collection ('civil society') of self-appointed and self-legitimating, more or less institutionalized, representations of individual interests, special interests, and public interests is to condemn international society to be a pre-revolutionary or counterrevolutionary system, as seen from the point of view of at least one orthodox theory of liberal democracy. 178 There is some merit in this position. Apart from the democratic complications posed by non-governmental organisations, these need not be benign: organised criminal fraternities do not pursue socially benevolent ends.
On the other hand, there is some evidence that civil society, particularly in the guise of non-governmental human rights bodies, are attempting to mend the radical discontinuity Allott perceives to exist between the domestic and international spheres by trying project morality-or at least legality-into the affairs of States. It is an effort Lawfare cannot, however, remedy comprehensively the ills of the world. This requires a radical root-and-branch reshaping of societies and the international society of all societies. While Allott may not hold all the answers as to how this is to be done, his work points the way to renewal. Contemporary arrangements are not immutable, and change is always possible. We exist in a state of flux:
The present is the presence of the past...all our social institutions are inheritances, each the particular product of a particular succession of events which occurred within the general history of human socialising, and in one or more of its particular sub-histories...both the capacities and the limitations of our social institutions, social good and social evil, are by-products and side-effects of that history and those histories. Above all...all our ideas have been historically produced-our ideas of God and gods, our ideas of nation and gender and race, our ideas of the true and the good and the beautiful, our ideas of society and law, our ideas of international society and international law, our ideas about our own humanity, our ideas about the past and the future, our ideas about ideas. All of them might have been otherwise. All of them are not otherwise. Social consciousness forms itself organically, by accretion and transformation. New ideas grow in the compost of old ideas. 182 The revolution, as we have been told, starts in our minds.
